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INTRODUCTION
Whether to implement global policies to reduce atmospheric emissions of carbon, and if so, by how much and by whom, remain issues of controversy in environmental debate. But despite calls for global carbon emission reduction targets emanating from the scientific community (such as the call from the 1988 Toronto Atmosphere Conference), and the commitments made by various OECD governments (Canada, Australia, U.K., Italy, and others) admittedly conditional upon other governments acting similarly to achieve target reductions, the economic case for these initiatives remains unclear. Both Nordhaus (1991) and Schelling (1991) have recently argued that the benefits of slowing global warming are hard to quantify, but are likely to be small for industrialized OECD economies (where most economic activity takes place in buildings, and is largely unaffected by climate change). They also argue that warming will occur slowly over a long period of time, and adaptation and adjustment to climate change will be relatively easy. Hence, if abatement through reduced consumption of carbon-based energy is socially costly, a major global emission reduction effort seems unjustified.
In contrast, Cline (1991) has emphasized the sharply escalating costs of a more pronounced acceleration in emissions beyond those implied by the frequently used 2xCO 2 (doubling of atmospheric carbon content) scenario (say to six times current CO 2 atmospheric concentration by the end of the next century). European economists also emphasize what they see as the small social cost of modest (15 to 20 percent) emission reductions in arguing their case for a carbon limitation initiative. Hence, not only is the scientific evidence in favour of global warming clouded, the economic debate on the costs and benefits of abatement seems similarly confused.
Global discussions on a framework to guide any future substantive negotiation on carbon emission reduction targets are now underway despite all the uncertainties listed above, even though 3 it has long been emphasized by economists (see Hoel [1989] , Grubb [1990] ) that these negotiations are fraught with a number of difficulties. Countries have an incentive to free-ride and not comply, unless other penalty devices (such as trade sanctions) are invoked. International monitoring and enforcement of targets is problematic. Developing countries worry about the impact of emission reductions on their development. And the allocation of targets and choice of instrument has many pitfalls (should prior emissions enter target calculations, are taxes or permits to be used and how are they to be administered, should existing domestic policies be credited in some way [credits to Europe for high energy taxes, for instance]). This paper attempts to shed some light on what the incentives are for international participation in such negotiations, focusing on what we term 'sub-global' carbon reduction initiatives. We examine the incentives (or lack of them) for sub-groups of countries to band together and agree on joint carbon emission reductions, despite the fact that some of the benefits accrue to countries other than those participating in the agreement. These groups might be North America and Europe, all OECD countries, just the North American economies, or other coalitions.
Our procedure is to use a six-region global general equilibrium trade and carbon emission model recently used by Whalley and Wigle (1991) to analyze the international incidence effects of various global carbon tax schemes. Here we modify this model so as to also capture the benefit side of reduced gjobaj farming by including temperature change (emission reduction) in the specification of preferences in each region. This change in model structure allows us to examine the strength of the incentives for sub-global arrangements to form with the aim of achieving reduced carbon emissions. Because there are no reliable estimates of the benefits from slowed global warming, we have adopted a procedure of evaluating incentives for any sub-global arrangements to be used relative to a reference point. We have chosen as our standard that a 50 percent global 4 emission reduction target, as in_the 1988 Toronto call, represents a full-participation global optimum, in which the sum of marginal country benefits from further global abatement exactly balance marginal country costs from further reductions in use of carbon-based energy. We emphasize that the assumption of a 50% cut being optimal in this way is strong and in no way do we mean to assert that it is necessarily realistic. However, using a reference point such as this enables us to evaluate the strength of incentives for sub-global arrangements of various kinds involving less that full international participation, and this reference point can then be varied in subsequent sensitivity analysis.
A number of interesting points emerge from our model calculations. Incentives for the larger regions to engage in unilateral emission reductions (including the U.S. which accounts for nearly 25 percent of global emissions) are surprisingly strong (more than half the assumed optimal 50% global reduction). The optimal reduction increases further when pairs of regions who each provide emission reduction benefits to the other are considered (more than 35 percent for North America and Europe). Also, terms-of-trade effects from such cuts help energy importers and amplify (in some cases substantially) the benefits to them of reduced emissions from slowed global warming. But both production and consumption-based cuts create spillover effects stimulating production or consumption in other regions. The overall picture that emerges is that even with limited country participation in such schemes, significant emission reductions given the assumed 50% full participation optimal cut) are still beneficial to participating countries.
2.

A NUMERICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR ASSESSING SUB-GLOBAL CARBON REDUCTION INITIATIVES
To assess the incentives for groups of countries to pursue various sub-global carbon reduction initiatives, we have extended the global general equilibrium model earlier used by Whalley and Wigle (1991) to analyze the international incidence effects of carbon taxes. We modify this earlier model by explicitly incorporating the benefits from slowed global warming from reduced carbon emissions through a specification of preferences which captures climate change.
This enables us to make a number of counterfactual calculations for alternative reduction initiatives in which the benefits from slowed global warming and the costs of reduced use of carbon based energy both appear. Because countries fully bear the costs of reduced carbon energy use, but only receive a portion of the global benefits from slowed global warming, go it alone reduction initiatives will typically involve smaller reductions than global reductions with full participation. . The forty-year time span is treated as a single period, and the model incorporates no explicit dynamics. The model also does not incorporate existing taxes on energy products, although in practice these vary by region, and would affect results. To further keep the 6 model manageable, the model does not identify fuel types within the broader category of carbonbased energy products, even though in practice various elements within this category (oil, coal, natural gas) have different carbon content.
In the model, the world is divided into six regions, indicated in Table 1 . These are the European Community, North America, Japan, other OECD, oil exporters (including all OPEC countries, and major non-OPEC energy exporters) and a residual rest of the world, representing most developing countries (those who are not oil exporters) along with the centrally planned economies. Data difficulties have precluded a separation between the two groups (i.e., between centrally planned and other developing countries) for now. 
OIL EXPORTERS (OPEC countries, plus major non-OPEC exporters) [OEXP]
Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia, Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
REST OF THE WORLD (Developing Countries and Centrally Planned Economies) [ROW]
This is a residual category containing all other countries; including USSR, Eastern Europe, China, Brazil, India, and other developing countries not in category 5.
* Abbreviations in square brackets are used to identify regions in the results tables which follow.
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Nested CES functions are used to represent production and demand in each region; with the nesting structure set out in Table 2 . Each region is endowed with four non-traded primary factors: (i) primary factors, exclusive of energy resources, (ii) carbon-based energy resources (deposits of oil, gas and coal), (iii) other energy resources (hydro-electric and nuclear capacity), and (iv) sectorspecific skills and equipment in the energy-intensive manufacturing sector. Both energy resources are treated as able to be converted into the relevant energy products through a refining/extraction process which uses other resources (primary factors). There are three internationally traded commodities: carbon-based energy products, energy-intensive manufactures, and other goods (all other GNP). Energy-intensive manufactures, other goods, and the composite energy product (carbon-based and non-carbon-based energy) enter final demands.
For each of five produced goods in each region (listed in Table 1 ), production is represented by nested CES functions. Carbon-based and non-carbon-based energy products use the respective energy resources and primary factors. Non-carbon-based energy products are non-traded, since hydro-electric, solar and nuclear power are not traded in significant quantities between the regions as defined. A domestic energy composite is produced by a third (energy conversion) industry, using inputs of the two energy products. The two final-goods (energy-intensive manufactures, and other goods) use primary factors and the composite domestic energy product as inputs. Perfect competition is assumed throughout in all regions and for all sectors. While this change in the model is conceptually straightforward, and parallels the analysis of public goods in the public finance literature (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1989) ) there are major problems with numerical specification oj^tiie^e preJFejrence_fa^ As is by now well-known, there are no widely agreed estimates as to how large or small the benefits of a slowing of global warming are. On the other hand, there are suggestions such as those in Nordhaus (1990) and Schelling (1990) , that the benefits of slowing global warming are likely quite small. Nordhaus puts these at no more than three-quarters of one percent of GDP for the United
States over a seventy-five year period, whereas Scheliing suggests that these are so imperceptibly small and likely to take place over a long period of time (say seventy-five years) that they would be little noticed by most individuals. On the other hand, economists such as Cline (1991) have argued that with a possible septupling in levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by the end of the next century, the potential costs associated with this are so large that emission reductions should be undertaken immediately. He emphasizes how most debate on the global warming has focused on he consequences of a doubling of atmospheric CO 2 by the middle of the next century, for which temperature rise could be modest, rather than on the larger increases in CO 2 content which would occur in the century to follow and for which the consequences are more alarming.
While our analysis of incentives to participate in sub-global carbon reduction initiatives would Bibliofhek 4es Institute fur Weltwirtschcj-13 obviously be more convincing if there were a firmer fix on the size of the possible benefits involved, given the profile of the policy debate we think it is nonetheless instructive to _make_ calculations based on various assumptions on the tenefitjide. What we have done, therefore, is to assume that calls for emission reductions voiced at various international confeiences would be consistent with a global optimal allocation if they were implemented on a full participatory basis.
We then evaluate incentives for various sub-global arrangements relative to that reference point
The call for emission reductions emerging from the 1988 Toronto conference (A 20 percent emission reduction by the year 2005, with a 50 percent emission reduction to follow to stabilize CO 2 content) provides the basis for the strongest of our assumptions: that a 50 percent carbon emission reduction by all regions corresponds to a global full participation externality correcting intervention. We are then able to analyze incentives for various sub-global initiatives to be pursued by including sub-groups of two or three countries or regions.
The parameterization of the extended version of the Whalley-Wigle model, therefore, allows for calibration of preferences, with both the preference and production side parameters being correspondingly generated. Counterfactual analysis then allows us to compute the implications of various carbon reduction relative to the base case scenario for the model, given assumptions on the form of full participation carbon emission reduction, and the decision criterion for the size of the cut. If a 50% reduction is assumed to be a full participation optimum, the question we pose is how large is the go it alone cut for the U.S., the E.C., the U.S. plus the E.C., the OECD countries, and so on. 
RESULTS
If global negotiations on carbon reduction initiatives are taken further in the next decade, the incentives to free-ride, particularly for the smaller countries may well be such that less than full global participation is the outcome. Despite such an outcome, however, individual countries or regions may nonetheless have an incentive to participate in reduction initiatives by sub-groups of countries, such as the OECD countries, the EC and the U.S., or pursue go-it-alone incentives. The intuition is that the smaller the group of countries involved, the smaller the incentive to make large cuts in carbon emissions because of the spillover of benefits to other countries 3 .
We have used the model described earlier including the specification of regional preferences towards global warming to investigate how large these incentives are. We use a series of model runs in which we compute what we call the 'maximum consensus emission reduction' for various groups of countries or regions in the model, given the assumed optimality of a full participation equilibrium at various levels. These maximum consensus reductions are the minimum of the joint participation emission reductions that each member of a group of countries or regions would be willing to undertake on a sub-group basis, using the criterion that no country is made worse off by participating. It should be noted that in the single country case, this is not the optimal single country cut, but that cut equivalent in welfare terms to no cut. Such cuts are therefore typically larger than optimal cuts in the single country case. Table 3 reports results for twelve combinations of countries and regions cutting consumption of carbon based energy. We initially report the six individual region go-it-alone cases, calculating the cuts implied by the parameterization and model specification described earlier, and then report These results suggest that for the U.S. (NAM) and the E.C. that if 50 percent is the optimal full participation equilibrium reduction, the maximum non-losing go-it-alone cut for these regions is more than one-half of this. Even for Japan the go-it-alone cut is 17 percent. Hence, the incentives for carbon emission reductions remain high, even without a full participation global treaty.
The reason for these striking results is that, in this model, with smoothly substitutable preferences and technology there is diminishing marginal utility to slowed global warming, while (from Harberger's rule and ignoring the global externality effects) there are increasing marginal welfare costs of emission reduction through carbon-based energy taxes or quotas. Hence small reductions are at higher marginal benefits and lower marginal cost than is true with larger reductions. Hence, with the U.S. and E.C. each accounting for around one-quarter of gross world product, their go-it-alone emission reduction is still one-half the assumed global full participation reduction. For Europe and North America taken together, the maximum consensus emission reduction jumps to 36 percent, which in turn jumps to 42 percent if Japan is added into the coalition. For the group of all OECD countries, the maximum consensus emission reduction remains at 47 percent, in contrast to the assumed 50 percent optimal full participation cuts. Thus the OECD countries, in combination, would on these criteria be prepared to undertake a cut of approximately nine tenths of the optimal global cut, despite the fact that China and the Soviet Union between them constitute around 30 percent of global emissions of carbon. The same feature of the shape of marginal cost and marginal benefit schedules in the model accounts for this result Table 4 reports results showing the differences involved with sub-global incentives for emission reduction, depending upon whether these are production or consumption-based cuts. For global reduction schemes, this should make little difference outside of any revenue disbursement effects involved, but sub-globally it makes a big difference since consumption reductions are localized to 18 the country involved on the consumption side, while production reductions more directly affect global markets. Table 4 Differences Maximum consensus production reductions, even on a go-it-alone basis, are typically larger than comparable consumption reductions. This is an important result indicating differences from a national point of view between consumption and production emission reductions, even though these may not be present at a global level. It is a direct reflection of the relative elasticities on production and consumption.
These results, therefore, highlight a feature of emission reduction initiatives not thus far widely appreciated in the literature; namely, the difference between regional incentives to make production or consumption reductions. Reducing production in one country induces other countries to increase production through the associated effect on prices, rather than localize the effect to the region in which the emission reduction takes place. Table 5 highlights a further important difference between different types of sub-global emission reduction initiatives, illustrating how different sub-global carbon reduction initiatives can come into play under different arrangements. We consider cases of production and consumption reduction initiatives with and without constraints which maintain production and/or consumption at the same levels in the non-participating countries as in the base case in the model. In practice, this might involve a scenario in which larger countries (the E.C, the U.S.) use trade or other sanctions to prevent non-participant countries increasing consumption of carbon-energy-based products following a consumption reduction in the U.S. and lowered world energy prices. Table 5 The The differences between these results are striking. With such a constraint the go-it-alone emissions reductions are larger than the full participation optimal cut, in part due to associated terms of trade effects. Table 6 reports changes in consumption of carbon-based energy and of carbon-based energy production in a number of cases, indicating the spillover effects between alternative cases. For instance, a 30% consumption cut in the EC generates a 3-5% energy production increase in the other regions, and only a 1.2% reduction globally. Terms-of-trade effects are also significant, strongly emphasizing their role in the results discussed above.
Finally in Table 7 , we report some model sensitivity analyses for maximum consensus emission reductions under different elasticity assumptions, calibration specifications, and other model assumptions. What emerges is a reasonable robustness of results for the EC+NAM coalition. In each case, the value of the maximum consensus cut moves in the expected direction, increasing for higher carbon energy supply elasticities, and decreasing for calibration to an optimal 25% cut Higher elasticities between carbon and non-carbon energy make little difference. The difference between production and consumption based cuts is less when the size of the optimal cut to which we calibrate the model in the base case is reduced. preferences with benefits of slowed global warming. We emphasize the problems in calibrating models of global warming as far as the benefits which may follow any reduction in global warming are concerned, and are only able to calibrate the model under strong assumptions. We use as our reference point that one of the current proposals for carbon reduction initiatives is consistent with_ a full participation global optimal allocation. This then enables us to analyze mcentiyes for subglobal carbon reduction emissions relative tqjhe reference poinL__ Some important themes emerge from our results. The go-it-alone cut for the EC and the U.S.
(North America) is (in percentage terms) about two thirds of the calibrated global cut. For the OECD countries in combination, over nine tenths of the globally optimal cuts would remain as a sub-global participation initiative for these countries. These large go-it-alone cuts reflect the model generated marginal benefit and marginal cost schedules of reduced global warming. Marginal cost schedules are accelerating in the depth of cut, reflecting Harberger's triangle rule, while marginal benefit schedules are decelerating reflecting diminishing marginal utility of slowed global warming.
As a result, even with the large spillover effects on the benefit side, the U.S. and the E.C. each have an incentive for a go-it-alone reduction equal to one-half of full participation global reductions.
Important differences in sub-global reduction initiatives also emerge from our results, particularly differing country incentives to undertake production or consumption reductions. Production reduction initiatives have the effect of increasing global producer prices and, therefore, increasing production in other regions. Consumption reduction initiatives are more localized to the country 25 undertaking such a measure, reducing world prices and increasing consumption in other regions.
Terms-of-trade effects also emerge from model results as important, and tend to compound with crossover effects from slowed emission reduction, and reduced energy consumption or production.
APPENDIX A Elasticities in the Model
In the model, the implied demand and supply elasticities for carbon-based energy products are important parameters as far as the effects of carbon emission reduction initiatives are concerned.
The values of these elasticities are not directly specified in the model formulation, but instead reflect preferences and intermediate production technology on the demand side, and the relative importance of fixed and variable factors in carbon-based energy production (oil in the ground versus extraction costs) and the marginal productivity of variable factors in this production process on the supply side.
We are able to solve the model under varying carbon energy product supply elasticity assumptions relatively easily, since in the special case where the production function for carbonbased energy products is Cobb-Douglas, the supply elasticity is given simply as 1-8/9 where 8 is the share parameter on the carbon resource input in the carbon-based energy product production function.
Surprisingly, there are relatively few estimates of energy supply elasticities in the literature; most estimation is concerned with income and own-price elasticities on the demand side, or interfuel substitution elasticities (see Kouris [1981] and Pindyck [1979] . The supply elasticities that have been estimated are mainly for OPEC countries, and focus on strategic supply response over relatively short periods of time; not the longer run elasticities at issue here which reflect exploration and extraction cost functions.
The ease with which the composite energy output can be produced from varying mixes of energy inputs (carbon and non-carbon-based energy), and the ease of substitution between composite
